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The paper examines the Armey-Rahn hypothesis of the inverted U-shaped relationship between
public health care expenditure and economic growth in the European economies over the 1995-2018
period. To this end, the aggregate production function (in levels or logarithms) augmented by
spending and economic openness terms is estimated. The fixed-effects panel regression, the panel
quantile regression with fixed effects, and the panel ARDL models are used for empirical analysis. The
paper unequivocally indicates the existence of the Armey-Rahn curve and the negative effects of
health care spending on the output (per capita) beyond the optimal spending level. Irrespective of the
functional form of the model or the definition of dependent or independent variables, the optimal
level was estimated to be smaller than the actual average health care spending level for the period
(5.99% of GDP), indicating the over-provision of public health care. Under-provision of public health
care was documented for the transition economies in Eastern Europe (that were characterised by
comparatively small size of GDP, low per capita output and higher optimal spending levels, economic
transition challenges, and lagging health care spending, in addition to indivisibilities of the public
health investment).
JEL Classification: C33, H51, N34
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Introduction
The cost escalation of health care and the expansion of health expenditure beyond the optimal level
is a phenomenon that has been observed across the economies and examined extensively in health
economics. The literature attributes this development to a number of interrelated factors: the
technological change in the medical field (that results in the introduction of new and more costly
medical technologies); the demographic changes (population ageing in the developed world and the
ongoing demographic boom in certain developing countries, necessitating, albeit for different reasons,
the expansion of health care services); the demands and perceptions on the part of users of medical
services (the view of health care as basic and universal right, and hence the requirement of universal
or expanded coverage, wider range and better quality of medical services); political-economic and
bureaucratic pressures (associated with the operation of a complex network of government bodies,
service providers, insurance and pharmaceutical companies, stakeholders and vested interests of
various sorts); the objective medical challenges (the chronic diseases in the developed world, and
new infectious diseases, such as novel corona-virus); to name a few (Finkelstein, 2007; Smith et al,
2009; Jenkner, Leive, 2010: 2).i
The cost and expenditure challenges are well manifested in the developed economies, where,
according to OECD survey (OECD, 2015), public funds account for around three-quarters of health
spending and could increase from around 6% of GDP in 2015 to almost 9% of GDP in 2030, and as
much as 14% by 2060 unless governments contains cost growth.
The definitive answer as to the over-, under- or optimal provision of the health care expenditure (and
government expenditure in general) requires consideration of possible non-linearities in the
expenditure-economic growth relationship. In this respect, the Armey-Rahn hypothesis of the positive
growth or output effects of government expenditure up to a certain point and conversely its negative
effects beyond this point (represented by the ‘Armey-Rahn curve’ and the ‘Scully point’ on this curve)
serves as a useful tool for the empirical research and a measure to be used for effective cost
containment policies (Rahn, Fox, 1996; Scully, 2000).
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This paper considers an empirical issue of the possible presence of Armey-Rahn curve in health
spending in 28 European economies over the period of 1995-2018, specifically to establish 1).
whether the relationship between health spending and the level and growth rate of GDP is non-linear
(as postulated by the Armey-Rahn hypothesis); and 2) whether health spending is over- or
under-provided relative to its optimal level.
To this end we introduce the following novelties. Firstly, we include health expenditure (as proportion
of GDP) and its square term as regressors in the aggregate production function for the economy
together with capital and labour inputs and other relevant variables, an approach that was previously
adopted for the analysis of the effects of other expenditure types (Goel et al, 2008, for the analysis of
economic impacts of R&D spending in the US; Zhang and Li, 2008, for the identification of the optimal
size of rural fiscal expenditure in China). Secondly, we experiment with alternative specifications:
basic that includes solely health expenditure, and augmented that includes labour, capital, and a
measure of economic openness. Thirdly, given the mixed order of integration of variables, the likely
lags in the effect of expenditure on economic outcomes, and unobserved country heterogeneity that
can cause health expenditure having different effects along the conditional distribution of GDP (or its
growth rate), we employ three econometric techniques: panel OLS model with fixed or random
effects, panel quantile model with fixed effects, as well as panel autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL)
model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of literature
related to Wagner law, its limitations, Armey-Rahn curve hypothesis as a way to address these
limitations, as well as empirical research on the topic. Section 3 presents model specification, data
sources as well as econometric methodology. Section 4 submits to empirical testing of the Armey
curve, determination of the optimal size of the public expenditure and discussion of policy
implications, while the last section provides concluding remarks and discusses the possible directions
for the future research.
Literature review
We review two complementary streams of literature: 1). Studies that examine the theoretical
foundations of ‘Armey-Rahn curve’ hypothesis as well as the empirical studies that attempt to provide
empirical evidence to support this hypothesis; and 2). The research on the relationships between
health care expenditure and economic variables (including GDP and economic growth as dependent
variables).
Armey-Rahn curve
Wagner Law, formulated by A. Wagner in 1893, and empirically tested on numerous occasions and in
diverse settings postulates the growth of government spending in excess of growth in economic
output, both when absolute or relative magnitudes are concerned. If iY is the level of economic
output, iG is the level of government expenditure in country i , the Wagner Law relationship
between the two variables would be represented as ii mYG  , where 0m , 1
and )/)(/( iiii dYdGGY , i.e. elasticity of government spending with respect to output is greater
than one (Balatsky, 2012: 41). A number of mechanisms behind Wagner law were identified: the
expansion of administrative and protection activities by the state in lieu of such activities conducted
by the private sector; the growth of cultural and welfare functions of the state; the functioning of
government-owned natural monopolies; state expansion driven by bureaucratic pressures and
preferences; lobbying and voting that lead to higher (re-)distribution through the state (Niskanen,
1971; Persson, Tabellini, 199).
The infinite operation of Wagner Law, however, is impossible on theoretical and logical grounds, as it
would imply disproportionate growth of the public finance relative to the total economy, the growing
appropriation of income by the government, and eventually, socialisation of the economy, the
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process that never reaches apex in modern market, mixed or even centrally-planned economies
(Balatsky, 2012: 41-46). The operation of Wagner Law would also be constrained by the political and
economic context of a given economy, with positive elasticity of government spending with respect to
output likely observed in the less developed economies or in economies with smaller degree of state
intervention, and negative elasticity in the more developed or the ones with more interventionist
state (Yavas, 1998; Tanzi, Schuknecht, 1997; Durevall, Henrekson, 2011). Likewise, the negative
effects of public sector expansion on the economy would become prominent at some point, e.g.
expansion of public sector that increases tax burden and provides disincentive to invest; the decrease
in total productivity due to proliferation of less efficient public enterprises; the comprehensive
planning and management of the economy by the government, instead of law and order provision
and guaranteeing of property rights; production of private goods, as opposed of provision of public
goods and externalities’ correction (Baumol, 1993; Vedder, Gallaway, 1998; Magazzino, Forte, 2010:
4).
The U-shaped Armey curve reflects these processes that offset the initially positive effects of growing
public expenditure: the elasticity of government spending (as percentage of output) with respect to
output growth rate is postulated to be negative to the right of inflection point on Armey curve (‘Scully
point’), against Wagner law premises, and positive to the left of it, in line with Wagner law.
Mathematically, if YGg / is a government expenditure as percentage of GDP, and YY / is
output growth rate, the ‘Scully point’ is identified when 0 g and 022  g (Balatsky,
2012: 47).
The empirical validation of Armey curve was conducted according to three alternative methods.ii
Firstly, the (Granger-) causality or path analysis would investigate feed-forward and feedback
relationships between output and public expenditure, with causality running from GDP growth to
government spending growth (and positive relationship between the two variables) corresponding to
Wagner law, while the reverse causality running from public expenditure to GDP growth indicating
indirectly the Armey curve relationship (positive relationship superseded by the negative). The studies
by Wu et al (2010), and Facchini, Melki (2011) fall into this methodological category. The second
approach (‘direct’ estimation of Armey curve) would represent output (in levels or in growth terms) as
a function of the level or growth rate of expenditure, augmented by squared expenditure (to capture
non-linearities in growth-expenditure relationship) and control variables to incorporate the influence
of other factors on output. The presence of Armey curve relationship and the optimal size of the
government expenditure would then be determined from the signs and values of coefficients of the
expenditure terms. The studies by Facchini, Melki (2011), Herath (2012), among others, followed this
approach. Thirdly, the presence of Armey curve can be established following the estimation of
non-linear Cobb-Douglas production function in logs with output as a function of total factor
productivity, government expenditure/GDP and tax revenue/GDP ratios, as proposed by Scully (1994).
Under the balanced budget assumption and following differentiation of a production function with
respect to expenditure, the optimal tax rate and government size are estimated and the presence of
Armey curve is established. This method was followed by Chao and Grubel (1998), Schoeman and van
Heerden (2009), El Husseiny (2018), among others.
The presence and significance of the Armey curve was established in a large number of studies,
however, there is less agreement regarding the optimal size of government. Across the economies,
the optimal size of the government (total government expenditure) varied substantially: in a range of
37%-42% of GDP in a panel of 12 European economies (Pevcin, 2004); 41.2% of GDP in 23 OECD
economies in 1999 (De Witte, Moesen, 2010); 35.4-43.5% of GDP in a sample of 27 EU economies
during 1970-2009 (Magazzino, Forte, 2010); 25% of GDP for 28 EU economies over the same period
(Chobanov, Mladenova, 2009); 16.2% and 16.9% in a sample of 21 low income and 11 low-middle
income economies (Hajamini, Ali Falahi, 2014); 23% across a large sample of 118 economies (Karras,
1996); and 40% in a panel of low income economies (Davies, 2009). For individual economies, the
estimates of optimal government size were as follows: 44% in Israel and 35% in Tunisia, based on
non-military public consumption during 1968-1997 period (Handoussa, Reiffers, 2003); 27% in Sri
Lanka during 1959-2009 period (Herath, 2012); 30.5%-31.2% in Egypt during 1981-2015 period (El
Husseiny, 2018); 28.0% in Russia and 38.7% in Sweden during 1990-2007 period (Balatsky, 2012); 23%
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in Italy in 1986-1998 (Magazzino, 2008); 21% in Bulgaria in 1990-2004 (Mavrov, 2007); 22.8%, 7.3%
and 14.9% in Taiwan based on total government, investment and consumption government
expenditure respectively (Chen, Lee, 2005); 29%-30% in France, with a peak in Armey curve reached
in the aftermath of WWII (Facchini, Melki, 2011); around 20% in the US (Peden, 1991; Scully, 1994;
Vedder, Gallaway, 1998); 23% in New Zealand (Scully, 1994); and a low 10.8-15.9% across South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia (Chiou-Wei et al, 2010).
As far as the relationship between the specific types of public expenditure and the economic output
(growth) are concerned, the empirical literature has been scant. Two studies of the Wagner Law and
Armey curve at the sub-federal level in the US are notable (Vedeer and Gallaway, 1998, and Miller,
2008). Both use disaggregated expenditure data and focus on the 1947-1997 and 1976-2005 periods
respectively. Both studies confirmed the existence of Armey curve in certain (but not all) states and
likewise suggested the existence of state-specific and expenditure-specific optimum expenditure
levels, thereby preventing from making policy or theoretical generalisations based on Armey curve.
The former study indicated optimum levels that were few percentage points higher than the latter
study. Another study by Zhang and Li (2008), while not looking explicitly at Armey curve (or
non-linearities in expenditure-output pair) considered the optimum levels of rural fiscal expenditure
in China during the 1980-2005 period: setting the aggregate production function for the total
economy, and estimating the marginal product and output elasticity of the rural expenditure, the
authors determine the optimal expenditure level at 13.2% of rural GDP, well above the average
expenditure levels for the period.
Health care expenditure and GDP
As far as the relationship between public health expenditure (and its optimal level) and economic
outcomes is concerned, the literature focused on the following issues. Firstly, the debate has been
underway as to the nature of health, i.e. whether it is a necessity or luxury good, the latter suggesting
that growth of spending on health should exceed the overall economic and income growth, and in
turn giving rise to the discussion of the overspending and cost containment (Gerdtham et al, 1992;
Getzen, 2000). Secondly, the empirical studies examined the determinants of health spending,
confirming the important influence of the country’s GDP level on the the level of spending (both
cointegration and causality between the two, Clemente et al, 2004), but also highlighting the
importance of demographic, institutional, fiscal and macroeconomic factors (Hitiris, Posnett, 1992;
Zwiefel et al, 1999; Di Matteo, 2003). Thirdly, the literature examined the relationship between
private and public health spending (Yazici, Kaestner, 1998; Ying, Chang, 2019), and generally gave
support to the crowding out hypothesis (private spending displaced by the public)
The studies that specifically examined the optimal level of health expenditure have been scant. Chang
and Ying (2006) considered health expenditure levels in the 15 OECD countries during the 1980-1998
period and estimated the Solow growth model with health expenditure, representing investment in
human capital, as one of the regressors in the aggregate production function (alongside labour and
physical capital). The optimal level of expenditure was conceptualised as a steady-state, where the
growth rate of per unit of labour health (human) capital is zero, but the level of health (human) grows
at the same rate as population. The model included control variables to account for demographic
state of the respective country, nature of the health care system, and economic factors. The authors
demonstrate an increasing trend in both optimal and actual health expenditure, and overspending in
all OECD economies in question. The gap between optimal and actual spending attenuated over time
in most economies (excepting Spain and Greece), representing the effectiveness of the cost
containment measures. Other findings were consistent with previous literature and theory (negative
relationship between mortality, population growth, environmental pollution and unemployment on
one hand and spending on the other; and conversely, the positive effects of the existing health capital
stock on health spending).
A more recent study by Wang (2015) adopts Grossman model of demand for health, where health is
defined as a durable capital stock that produces an output of healthy time (Grossman, 1972: 246),
and estimates an aggregate production function for OECD economies over 1990-2009 period with
health expenditure as regressor and GDP per capita as dependent variable. The generalised method
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of moments estimation indicates the optimal level of total health expenditure (including private
spending) at 7.55% of GDP compared to the actual spending share of 5.48%, suggesting the




In a general form, the relevant equation specifications for the empirical analysis are derived from the
Cobb-Douglas production function augmented by government expenditure and exports or openness
measures (Anaman, 2004; Kustepeli, 2005: 4; Hok et al, 2014: 36-37):
       5432210exp  itititititit OPKLHXHXGDP  (1)
,where itHX and
2
itHX are public health care expenditure and its squared term, itL and itK are
labour and capital inputs, itOP is the openness indicator for country i at period t , and exp is
exponential operator.
In logarithmic form the function is represented as follows and is hence amenable for empirical
analysis:
ititititititit OPKLHXHXGDP   543
2
210 lnlnlnlnln (2)
,where all variables are defined as above, and t is a normally distributed residual term. The
Armey-Rahn hypothesis is deemed confirmed when quadratic relationship between expenditure and
GDP is deemed confirmed, i.e. when 01  and 02  .
This specification (Specification 1) has been adopted in the empirical studies by Facchini and Melki
(2011) and Cetin (2017). The second specification (Specification 2), used by Vedder, Gallaway (1994),
Miller (2008), and Hok et al (2014) as an alternative estimation method, regresses the logarithm of
the real GDP against the health care spending variables without logarithms (i.e. variables in levels). As
part of robustness check, we also tried additional three specifications (Specifications 3, 4 and 5): with
GDP growth as dependent variable; with lags of the dependent and independent variables to account
for dynamic effects; and with I(1) order variables in the growth rates representation.

















The panel dataset used in this study covered the period from 1995 to 2018 and included 28 countries
in the European Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) area: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Thus, it consists of the original members
of the EU and the new members (formerly socialist economies), economies with different levels of
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GDP per capita and standard of living, albeit generally having publicly funded health care or with
public health care co-existing alongside private one (with the exception of Switzerland).
The general government health expenditure by function data (in millions of Euro or as percent of GDP)
was extracted from the Eurostat database, with respective government functions following
Classification of the Function of the Government (COFOG), Version 1999 (OECD, 2011: 194-5). In
COFOG, the public expenditure on health is defined to include (at the second level of the classification)
expenditure on medical products, appliances and equipment, outpatient, hospital and public health
services, on health-related research and development (R&D), , as well as other health expenditure not
elsewhere classified. The GDP at market prices and the chain-linked volume measures of GDP (with
the base of the chain-linked volume index set at 2010) were likewise obtained from the Eurostat.
The capital stock data was taken from the Annual Macroeconomic Database of the European
Commission (AMECO): net capital stock for the total economy at 2015 prices in Euros (OKND variable
code). The values were recalculated to 2010 constant prices to achieve consistency with other
variables, using price deflator for the gross fixed capital formation in the total economy (PIGT variable
code). Employment figures for the total economy (with original source in the countries’ national
accounts) were also obtained from AMECO (NETN variable code). Trade openness was estimated from
the GDP, exports and imports at constant prices as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP
expressed in percentage terms.
Econometric method
Panel unit root tests were first conducted to identify possible unit root in the series
(Im-Pesaran-Shin/IPS, Levin-Lin-Chu/LLC, Breitung, ADF-Fisher 2 , PP-Fisher 2 and cross-sectionally
augmented IPS / CIPS tests)iii, as well as the cross-sectional dependence tests (Breusch-Pagan, 1980;
Pesaran, 2004) to identify correlation across space (cross-sectional dependence). The absence of
series integrated of order one, I(1), indicates the appropriateness of standard panel least square
techniques (pooled OLS, fixed or random effect models); in contrast, their presence would suggest
using panel VECM, panel VAR in first differences, or, in the case of mixed orders of integration, panel
ARDL models. As shown in the next section, there was strong evidence of stationarity in levels for all
series in question, particularly for variables in levels and when the test that address cross-sectional
dependency is used.
We waive the assumption of the absence of systematic differences among the economies, and use
fixed- and random-effects panel models (instead of pooled OLS). The fixed-effect model assumes
different intercept terms ( i ) for individual panels and homogeneous coefficients of the regressors,
as follows:
ititiit XGDP  ln (5)
,where itX is the vector of independent variables, Ni ,,1 , Tt ,,1 , i is unobserved and
time-invariant individual effect, and it is an error term.
The random-effect model includes individual effects as random variables:
ititit XGDP   0ln (6)
,where iitit  
Hausman test is used to select fixed-effects and random-effects models, and Driscoll-Kray standard
errors are obtained, if there is evidence of serial autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence, as
well as heteroskedasticity (Driscoll, Kraay, 1998).
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We also apply panel quantile regression (Koenker, Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2004) that addresses the
simplifications of the standard econometric techniques (e.g. least squares method) and estimates the
conditional median or quantiles of the dependent variable (as opposed to conditional mean of the
dependent variable in the least-squares models). The quantile regressions are robust to outliers,
heteroskedasticity and skewness in the dependent variable (Li et al, 2020: 10), describe the entire
conditional distribution of the dependent variable, allow for non-identical distribution of the error
terms across the conditional distribution, and varying slope parameters at different quantiles
(Buchinsky, 1994). Its use is justified by the fact that the influence of health expenditure on GDP and
its growth may vary depending on the type of health care financing (private versus public), the levels
of health care expenditure and other heterogeneity in the relationship among the variables.
We use method of moments quantile regression (MM-QR) for panel data method recently proposed
by Machado and Santos Silva (2019), that includes the fixed effects and that is applicable to
non-linear functional forms of the models. It overcomes the limitation of the standard quantile
regression that does not account for unobserved heterogeneity across the individual panels. It allows
the individual effects to affect the entire distribution rather than shifting means as in the standard
quantile regressions, and identifies the conditional heterogeneous covariance effects of independent
variables (Ike et al, 2020: 5).
Quantiles are estimated from the estimates of the conditional mean and conditional scale functions
(Li et al, 2020: 10). With itGDP in levels or logarithms representing dependent variable for country
i at time period t , whose distribution is conditional on itX , a vector of covariates ( itHX ,
2
itHX ,
itL , itK , and itOP of country i in period t ), the conditional quantiles  ZQGDP  for a
location-scale model is given as (Ike et al, 2020: 5; Li et al, 2020: 10):
ititiitiit UZXGDP )(
''   (7)
,where    10'   iti ZP , parameters   niii ,,1,,  represent fixed effects, itX is i.i.d.
for any i and is time-independent, itU is i.i.d. for any i or period t , orthogonal to itX and
satisfying moment conditions 0)( UE and   1UE . itZ is a vector of differentiable
transformations of the components of X .
The panel quantile function for quantile  is therefore defined as:
       qZXqXQ ititiiitGDP ''  (8 )
,where  itGDP XQ  is a quantile distribution of the itGDP conditional on the location of
independent variables. Quantile  fixed effect for panel i is given as     qiii  . The
sample quantile  q is estimated from optimization problem (Haylock, 2020: 16):
  qZR iitit
i t
 ˆˆˆmin  (9)
,where  ˆˆˆ 'itiitit XGDPR  , itR̂ being the residual from OLS regression, i̂ being the location
shift parameter, and ̂ being the scale parameter that represents effect heterogeneity and that is
obtained from regression of of the time-demeaned absolute value of residuals on variables Z .
As a last step, we employed panel autoregressive distributed lags (panel ARDL) model that is suitable
for the data with a mixed order of integration (as demonstrated in the following section), and that
allows estimation of the long- and short-run coefficients within a single framework. In contrast to the
mean group estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) that averages separate estimates for each group in
the panel and assumes intercepts, slope coefficients and error variances to vary across the groups, we
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used the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator that relaxes such assumption (Pesaran et al, 1999), and
imposes homogeneity restriction on the long-run parameters, while allowing short-run specifications
to differ across the countries. Due to the short-run parameter heterogeneity, PMG allows more
reliable and efficient estimates of the long-run coefficients as well as faster convergence to the
long-run equilibrium compared to the mean group estimator (Pesaran et al, 1999; Gemmell et al,
2014: 10).













































,where Nj ,,2,1  , Tt ,,2,1  , it are 1k coefficient vectors, and i is the group-specific
effect. Other specifications are estimated equivalently.
The error-correction representation of Equation (10) is given as:
   ititititiioiitiit OPKLHXHXGDPGDP 54322111  (11)


































































































As a first step, we examined the descriptive statistics of the series in logarithms (Table 1). All variables
had positive mean and median. The logarithm of the real capital stock had the highest standard
deviation, while the standard deviation of the logarithms of openness and the health care spending to
GDP ratio was the lowest. The null hypothesis of the normal distribution of the data was rejected for
the logarithms of real GDP, capital stock, openness, and the (squared) health care spending as
proportion of GDP at 1% significance level (and for the logarithm of employment at 5% level). All
variables were approximately symmetric around the mean with the exception of health care spending
as proportion of GDP variables that were skewed to the left. The real GDP, employment and real
capital stock were platykurtic, while other variables were leptokurtic. For the estimation we also use
health care spending variable without logarithmic transformation, as well as the growth rates of real
GDP, capital stock, employment and openness. These variables likewise had positive mean and
median and the growth rates had the highest standard deviation. The growth rate of real capital stock
was positively skewed to the right, the growth rate of employment and the health care spending as
proportion of GDP were skewed to the left, while other variables were symmetric. The respective
growth rate variables had large positive excess kurtosis, while health care spending variables were
platykurtic. The null hypothesis of the normal distribution was rejected for all variables.
As shown in Table 2 in the Appendix, the panel average public health care expenditure stood at 5.99%
of GDP, with a number of economies having much higher spending (the top five countries with the
highest spending as percentage of GDP being Austria, the UK, Denmark, Czech Republic and France).
The economies with below-average figure include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
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Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and Spain, while Switzerland was a clear outlier with the level of public
health care spending of 1.87% of GDP.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Statistic Mean Median Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis J-B prob. Obs
Log(GDP) 12.072 12.155 14.905 8.964 1.494 -0.038 2.181 0.000 672
Log(K) 6.232 6.397 9.065 2.959 1.638 -0.140 2.101 0.000 672
Log(L) 8.262 8.294 10.708 5.128 1.290 -0.180 2.708 0.049 672
Log(OP) 1.944 1.930 2.612 1.403 0.207 0.452 3.335 0.000 672
HX 5.987 6.442 9.447 1.574 1.680 -0.693 2.717 0.000 672
HX2 38.667 41.494 89.248 2.478 18.431 -0.159 2.076 0.000 672
Log(HX) 1.737 1.863 2.246 0.454 0.351 -1.488 5.051 0.000 672
Log(HX2) 3.142 3.470 5.043 0.206 1.051 -0.899 3.102 0.000 672
GDPGR 2.594 2.639 25.163 -14.814 3.404 -0.529 9.869 0.000 644
KGR 0.534 0.345 79.559 -33.482 5.352 4.728 79.889 0.000 644
LGR 0.735 0.929 6.586 -13.911 2.103 -1.570 10.285 0.000 644
OPGR 3.052 2.773 23.158 -17.678 5.393 -0.044 5.740 0.000 644
Note. The values of GDPGR, KGR, LGR and OPGR are expressed as percentages.
To account for cross-sectional dependence in panels, we conducted Breusch-Pagan (1980) and
Pesaran (2004) tests of cross-sectional dependence, given that T and N are not substantially
different in the panel (De Hoyos, Sarafidis, 2006: 483-4). The null hypothesis of the absence of
cross-sectional dependence (in both tests) is rejected for all variables (Table 3).
Table 3. Cross-sectional dependence tests’ results
Variable Breusch-Pagan LM Pesaran CD
Stat. p-value Stat. p-value
Log(GDP) 7544.669 (0.000) 85.585 (0.000)
Log(K) 2516.427 (0.000) 6.880 (0.000)
Log(L) 4159.721 (0.000) 38.350 (0.000)
Log(OP) 7274.399 (0.000) 82.754 (0.000)
HX 1972.337 (0.000) 17.252 (0.000)
HX2 1945.365 (0.000) 17.079 (0.000)
Log(HX) 1983.205 (0.000) 17.344 (0.000)
Log(HX2) 1977.960 (0.000) 17.281 (0.000)
GDPGR 3176.188 (0.000) 52.519 (0.000)
KGR 901.553 (0.000) 11.326 (0.000)
LGR 1429.180 (0.000) 30.572 (0.000)
OPGR 2357.202 (0.000) 43.093 (0.000)
Note. Cross-section means were removed during computation of correlations. p-values are indicated in the
parentheses.
The panel unit root tests (Table 4 in the Appendix) were implemented for the levels and the first
differences of the series, including constant (Model C) or constant plus trend (Model CT) deterministic
components. The real GDP, capital stock, employment, openness and health care to GDP ratio were
also represented in logarithmic form. The logarithm of health care spending to GDP ratio (in levels)
was stationary in both Models C and CT (the similar results are also obtained for the variable without
logarithms). The squared term of the health care spending to GDP ratio was likewise stationary in
both models (with or without logarithms). The logarithm of the real GDP (in levels) contained unit
root according to IPS and ADF-Fisher 2 tests in Model C and ADF-Fisher 2 and PP-Fisher 2 tests
in Model CT. The logarithm of the level of real capital stock was (trend) stationary in Models C and CT
according to all tests, except for the Breitung test. The logarithm of employment (in levels) followed
unit root behaviour under all tests in Model C, and under PP-Fisher 2 test in Model CT, while the first
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difference of the variable was (trend) stationary. The tests’ results for the logarithm of openness are
conflicting: in Model C, unit root is identified by the IPS and ADF-Fisher 2 tests, while in Model CT,
the unit root is indicated only by Breitung test. The first differences of all variables in question were
(trend) stationary. The tests performed on the levels of the growth rates of GDP, capital stock,
employment, and openness all indicate stationarity around the mean. The Pesaran CIPS (2007) test
was performed given that panels have common factor structure. For the variables in levels, the (trend)
stationarity was indicated in all instances, except for the logarithm of real capital stock and openness,
and health care spending variables (with or without logarithmic transformation) in Model CT. The first
differences of the variables were all (trend) stationary. Thus, we conclude that the variables were a
combination of I(0) and I(1) orders and none of the variables were integrated of order two.
Table 5 present the estimates of the panel regression with the two-way fixed effects, where the
health care as percentage of GDP (and the square term of the variable) are included in either
logarithms or levels (Specifications 1 and 2). Three equations for each specification are estimated:
trivariate, with health care spending variables as regressors; multivariate with capital and labour
inputs; and multivariate with capital, labour, and openness.
Table 5. Panel regression with fixed effects estimates
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
HX 0.448 0.449 0.498 0.093 0.078 0.082
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.059) (0.080)
HX2 -0.164 -0.170 -0.167 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.034)
L 0.197 0.417 0.213 0.422
(0.097) (0.012) (0.063) (0.010)
K 0.135 0.141 0.115 0.123
(0.078) (0.032) (0.125) (0.060)
OP 0.723 0.700
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant 12.153 9.605 6.209 12.227 9.717 6.489
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Period-effect 2147.380 1373.460 158.160 2222.910 1421.760 167.810
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Serial correlation 798.870 305.337 83.492 906.658 333.649 84.714
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Heteroskedasticity 11920.450 20899.510 16049.110 9343.950 14422.060 12996.040
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Optimal size (%) 3.930 3.747 4.466 4.855 4.511 5.122
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses.
The Hausman test is used to select between fixed and random effects, while the joint significance of
variables test is performed to justify the inclusion of the period effect in addition to the cross-section
effect. Wooldridge (2002: 282-3) and the modified Wald (Greene, 2000: 598) tests are used to detect
serial correlation and groupwise heteroskedasticity. The robust Driskoll-Kraay standard errors are
reported instead of conventional standard errors.
Columns 1 to 3 include equations with public health care variables in logarithms (with or without
additional regressors). All variables are significant at the 5% level of significance, except for the
logarithms of real capital stock and employment in the second equation (column) that are significant
at the 10% level. The expected signs of coefficients are positive for all variables except the squared
term of the public health spending (as proportion of GDP), indicating the positive effects of capital
and labour inputs as well as openness on GDP and the presence of Armey-Rahn curve. The optimal
level of public health expenditure to GDP ratio ranges from 3.74% to 4.47% of GDP, suggesting that
during the study period the public health expenditure was overprovided, when the whole panel is
considered. The diagnostic tests justified the use of a model with two-way fixed effects and
11
Driskoll-Kraay standard errors. Columns 4 to 6 contain Specification 2 estimates, where public health
care spending variables enter the equation without logarithmic transformation. The results are similar
in terms of signs and significance of the coefficients (except for the insignificance of the capital stock
variable in one of the equations) and the outcomes of the diagnostic tests. The optimal level of the
spending is somewhat higher, with public health care to GDP ratio ranging from 4.51% to 5.12% of
GDP.
To account for the effect of health care variables on GDP throughout the conditional distribution, we
considered the panel quantile model with fixed effects (Table 6). We provide the estimates for the
most encompassing equation in each specification. In Specification 1, all variables (except the squared
term of the health care spending to GDP ratio) were positive in each quantile, as expected. The
logarithms of employment and openness were significant (at the 5% level) in each quantile, while the
logarithm of the real capital stock was significant in quantiles 3 to 9 (at the 5% level). The significance
of both health care spending variables was established in quantiles 2 to 9, thereby confirming the
presence of the Armey-Rahn curve relationship. Comparing the estimates with the average spending
level for the period (5.99% of GDP) we conclude that the public health expenditure was overprovided
for quantiles 1 to 4 economies and underprovided for higher quantiles (quantiles 5 to 9). Specification
2 yields similar results: the employment and openness variables were significant in each quantile, the
capital stock was significant in quantiles 5 to 9, and the expected signs of coefficients were obtained.
At the 10% significance level, the Armey-Rahn curve was identified only in quantiles 5 to 7. The health
care expenditure was overprovided in quantiles 5 and 6, and underprovided in quantile 7 (albeit the
level of provision was very close to optimal level).
Table 6. Panel quantile regression with fixed effects estimates
Specification 1
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Log(HX) 0.770 0.718 0.676 0.634 0.599 0.566 0.542 0.515 0.492
(0.103) (0.050) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.025) (0.064)
Log(HX2) -0.192 -0.185 -0.180 -0.174 -0.170 -0.166 -0.162 -0.159 -0.156
(0.154) (0.077) (0.029) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) (0.040)
Log(L) 0.657 0.703 0.741 0.778 0.809 0.838 0.860 0.883 0.904
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(K) 0.128 0.130 0.132 0.134 0.135 0.137 0.138 0.139 0.140
(0.262) (0.141) (0.057) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.029)
Log(OP) 1.533 1.474 1.426 1.380 1.340 1.304 1.276 1.246 1.220
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Optimal size 7.420 6.939 6.540 6.159 5.831 5.530 5.302 5.057 4.840
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses.
Specification 2
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
HX 0.146 0.131 0.118 0.106 0.097 0.087 0.079 0.071 0.063
(0.338) (0.275) (0.206) (0.128) (0.071) (0.038) (0.045) (0.115) (0.252)
HX2 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.361) (0.287) (0.206) (0.117) (0.056) (0.023) (0.024) (0.066) (0.163)
L 0.678 0.720 0.757 0.792 0.819 0.848 0.869 0.893 0.914
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
K 0.113 0.116 0.119 0.122 0.124 0.127 0.128 0.130 0.132
(0.563) (0.450) (0.320) (0.172) (0.070) (0.017) (0.011) (0.024) (0.062)
OP 1.537 1.480 1.432 1.386 1.349 1.311 1.283 1.251 1.222
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Optimal size N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.275 6.068 5.900 N/A N/A
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses.
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Robustness checks
We performed several robustness checks. Firstly, in line with studies by Herath (2012), El Husseiny
(2018), and Forte and Magazzino (2018) who focused on the effect of health expenditure / real GDP
ratio and its square term, alongside the above variables, on the growth rate of real GDP, we examined
the alternative specification (Specification 3) with the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP as a
dependent variable (Table 7). The positive coefficients were obtained for all variables except real
capital stock and the squared term of the health care spending variable. All coefficients are significant
(except for health care spending variables in one of the equations), when conventional OLS standard
errors are used, whereas the majority are not significant when Driscoll-Kraay robust errors are used.
The Armey-Rahn curve relationship is identified only in the former case (equation with conventional
errors), with the optimal expenditure level being rather low (3.30% of GDP). This highlights possible
misspecification problems in the above studies when the dependent variable in differences (that is
likely stationary) is regressed against the variables in levels (that are likely to contain unit root).
Table 7. Panel regression with fixed effects estimates (Specification 3)
Variables Logarithms of HX and HX2 Levels of HX and HX2
SE D-K SE D-K
HX 0.092 0.092 0.003 0.003
(0.052) (0.335) (0.680) (0.861)
HX2 -0.038 -0.038 -0.001 -0.001
(0.008) (0.138) (0.201) (0.558)
L 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
(0.053) (0.336) (0.052) (0.333)
K -0.053 -0.053 -0.056 -0.056
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008)
OP 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.042
(0.043) (0.143) (0.062) (0.215)
Constant -0.064 -0.152 0.008 0.297
(0.723) (0.646) (0.962) (0.277)
Period-effect 407.190 18.210
(0.000) (0.000)




Optimal size (%) 3.305 NA
Note. p-values are indicated in parentheses. SE and D-K represent conventional and Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors.
Secondly, given the mixed order or integration of variables, with strong evidence of stationarity but
also certain evidence of unit roots (according to some of the tests), and the likely lags in the effects of
expenditure on GDP and its growth, we estimated the panel ARDL model that includes lags of
dependent and independent variables (Specification 4). The model was estimated with trend
components (given that GDP, capital stock and employment experience increase in level over time),
with a maximum of two lags (given the short span of the sample), with real GDP as dependent
variable, and all variables represented in levels (Table 8). Error correction term is negative and highly
significant, serving as indirect indication of convergence to steady state after a temporary shock. In
both specifications the Armey-Rahn curve was present, and the optimal levels of health expenditure
stood at 4.43% and 4.58% of GDP.
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Table 8. Panel ARDL estimates
Estimates Logarithms of HX and HX2 Levels of HX and HX2
Coeff Prob Coeff Prob
Long-run
HX 1.696 (0.000) 0.095 (0.000)
HX2 -0.570 (0.000) -0.010 (0.000)
L 0.537 (0.000) 0.521 (0.000)
K -0.323 (0.000) -0.422 (0.000)
OP 0.062 (0.072 0.002 (0.000)
Short-run
ECT -0.209 (0.000) -0.277 (0.001)
D(LGDP) 0.136 (0.061)
D(LX) -0.145 (0.829) -0.029 (0.593)
D(LHX(-1)) -0.037 (0.968) -0.029 (0.728)
D(LHX2) 0.005 (0.979) 0.000 (0.944)
D(LHX2(-1)) 0.015 (0.947) 0.002 (0.828)
D(LL) 0.696 (0.000) 0.586 (0.000)
D(LL(-1)) -0.072 (0.518) -0.156 (0.190)
D(LK) -0.018 (0.716) 0.044 (0.357)
D(LK(-1)) 0.039 (0.472) 0.076 (0.116)
D(LOP) 0.115 (0.000) 0.001 (0.004)
D(LOP(-1)) 0.048 (0.033) 0.000 (0.253)
Constant 1.559 (0.001) 2.573 (0.002)
Trend 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.006)
Optimal size (%) 4.428 4.588
Note. p-values are indicated in parentheses.
Thirdly, given that all variables, when expressed as growth rates, are stationary and that health care
spending variables in levels never contained unit root, we estimated the growth equations, where
GDP growth rate is a dependent variable, and the growth rates of other variables alongside the levels
of health care spending variables are the regressors (Table 9). The Armey-Rahn curve was likewise
present, and the optimal levels of expenditure were established at 3.74% and 4.22% of GDP in
Specification 5 (with or without logarithms of health care spending variables). The variables’ statistical
significance was adequate with both conventional OLS and Driscoll-Kraay errors. With cross-section
fixed effects included, the signs of coefficients that form Armey-Rahn relationship remain intact, but
the coefficients become statistically insignificant.
Table 9. Panel regression estimates (GDP growth as dependent variable)
Variable Logarithms of HX and HX2 Levels of HX and HX2
SE D-K SE D-K
KGR -0.068 -0.068 -0.069 -0.069
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.027)
LGR 0.845 0.845 0.841 0.841
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HX 9.536 9.536 1.095 1.095
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
HX2 -3.617 -3.617 -0.130 -0.130
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OPGR 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.136
(0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.042)
Constant -3.601 -3.601 0.069 0.069
(0.007) (0.000) (0.942) (0.933)
R2adj 0.430 0.422
Optimal size (%) 3.738 4.217
Note. p-values are indicated in parentheses. SE and D-K represent conventional and Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors.
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Fourthly, in the panel of economies considered, Switzerland stands out as outlier, with significantly
low public health care expenditure share. This reflects the organisation and financing of the health
system that is quite distinct from other European economies. Based on a crude classification of health
systems outlined by Jenkner and Leive (2010: 3), Switzerland relies on private delivery and financing
of health services similar to the USA (as opposed to public delivery and financing in, for instant,
Sweden and UK, public delivery and private financing in Singapore, or private delivery and public
financing in France and Germany). Based on this feature, we provide alternative estimates of the
optimal spending levels on a panel that excludes Switzerland. The results of the augmented model,
are not fundamentally different from the ones presented above: the optimal level of public health
care spending was established at 5.12% and 4.63% of GDP (for the fixed effects regression with the
levels and logarithms of the expenditure variables), and hence the expenditure is deemed
overprovided.
Lastly, we considered specification with GDP per capita as dependent variable. The results of the
panel quantile estimation with fixed effects confirm the earlier findings (Table 10). The expenditure
variables were significant and has correct sign (in line with Armey-Rahn curve hypothesis) in most
quantiles, the openness variable was positive and significant in all quantiles, while employment and
real capital stock were positive, but significant only in higher quantiles. In the specification with
logarithms of expenditure, the spending was under-provided in Quantiles 2 and 3 and over-provided
in higher quantiles, while in the specification with levels, the spending was under-provided in
Quantiles 1 to 6. The somewhat higher optimal levels of healthcare spending with GDP per capita as
dependent variable (compared to the ones when absolute level of GDP is used) are attributed to
presence in the panel of a large number of transition economies with below average levels of GDP per
capita and more resources as percentage of GDP devoted to health expenditure (Chang, Ying, 2006:
10).
Table 10. Panel quantile regression with fixed effects estimates (GDP per capita as dependent
variable)
Specification 1
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
Log(HX) 0.793 0.748 0.720 0.684 0.651 0.627 0.610 0.592 0.572
(0.118) (0.050) (0.021) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.025) (0.061)
Log(HX2) -0.212 -0.204 -0.199 -0.193 -0.187 -0.183 -0.180 -0.177 -0.173
(0.144) (0.062) (0.026) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.019) (0.047)
Log(L) 0.098 0.141 0.168 0.201 0.233 0.255 0.272 0.289 0.307
(0.546) (0.251) (0.095) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Log(K) 0.042 0.062 0.074 0.089 0.104 0.114 0.121 0.129 0.138
(0.728) (0.498) (0.320) (0.120) (0.035) (0.025) (0.029) (0.040) (0.059)
Log(OP) 1.603 1.554 1.523 1.485 1.448 1.423 1.404 1.384 1.363
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Optimal size N/A 6.264 6.107 5.904 5.700 5.561 5.454 5.336 5.212
Specification 2
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
HX 0.173 0.160 0.151 0.141 0.130 0.122 0.117 0.111 0.105
(0.067) (0.028) (0.011) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.028) (0.071)
HX2 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.058) (0.022) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.015) (0.043)
L 0.132 0.167 0.191 0.219 0.249 0.271 0.285 0.301 0.317
(0.408) (0.175) (0.058) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
K 0.026 0.044 0.056 0.071 0.086 0.097 0.104 0.112 0.121
(0.826) (0.634) (0.456) (0.236) (0.087) (0.061) (0.064) (0.079) (0.103)
OP 1.612 1.566 1.535 1.498 1.458 1.429 1.411 1.390 1.369
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Optimal size 6.638 6.295 6.247 6.183 6.123 6.036 5.987 5.939 5.876
Note. p-values are indicated in parentheses.
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Conclusion
An increase in public health expenditure in the developed economies, accompanied by the rising
budget deficits and public debt make cost containment and control over health expenditure a
pressing problem. The determination of the optimal level of public health expenditure level (i.e. the
level beyond which the negative effects on economic growth and GDP are experienced) thus becomes
instrumental in policy debate and decision-making.
The hypothesis of the inverted U-shape relationship between government spending and the output
and output growth (Armey-Rahn curve) has recently been subject to extensive research. The novelty
and the contribution of this paper is the extension of the hypothesis and its empirical verification in
the area of health spending, as a specific component of the aggregate spending. We examined the
Armey-Rahn curve relationship in a panel of European economies over the 1995-2018 period and
experimented with alternative specifications (in logarithms and levels of variables): the trivariate that
included health spending and its squared term as determinants of GDP, and multivariate that included
labour, capital and the measure of trade openness as additional regressors. To account for the
spending effects across the GDP conditional distribution as well as the dynamic effects and lagged
relationships, we respectively used the panel quantile model with fixed effects and the panel ARDL
model. Lastly, as part of robustness checks, we estimated models with the growth rates of the
variables, the GDP per capita as dependent variable, or for the panel that excluded Switzerland as an
outlier economy.
In every specification the health care spending variable was positive and significant, while its square
term was negative and significant, thereby confirming the Armey-Rahn hypothesis. In most
specifications, the level of optimal public spending on health care was below the actual average
spending of 5.99% of GDP, giving support to the excessive health spending thesis in European
economies. This result is in line with the findings from the study by Chang and Ying (2006) conducted
for a panel of OECD economies. The above-optimal levels of health spending were observed
notwithstanding the attempts that have been made in recent decades to control health spending and
the general tendency to downsize government spending. The findings of the panel quantile model
with (per capita) GDP as dependent variable suggest that public health spending was underprovided
in the lower quantiles. The panel included a significant number of transition economies from Eastern
Europe that a). are characterised by a smaller size of GDP compared to many of the original EU
members and hence larger optimal level of health spending as proportion of GDP; b). health spending
that has been lagging behind the one in Western Europe during the transition process and the
implementation of economic adjustment policies in the post-communism era, and c). Indivisibility of
public goods and health investment that result in high levels of optimal health spending. As stated by
Chang and Ying (2006) this result is counterintuitive, as more developed economies are expected to
value health outcomes more than less developed ones, and are likely to have higher optimal (desired)
levels of health spending.
The findings of this and similar studies need to be interpreted appropriately. Firstly, while the
majority of countries in the panel have socialised health care, the well-entrenched policies and
above-optimal spending levels, it may be argued that it is not the level of spending that is too high,
but the growth rate of GDP (that is a product of many other factors unrelated to the level of spending)
that is too low. Secondly, the deficiencies of the ‘single figure’ method of determining spending
optimality need to be noted. As put by Savedoff (2007), the issue of public health care spending is to
be discussed concurrently with the issue of public-private spending crowding out. Additionally, the
‘single figure’ approach may need to be complemented by the discussion of the composition of the
health care spending, the efficiency of health spending (with similar levels of spending per capita or
spending shares delivering profoundly different health outcomes in different countries), the influence
of vested interests on the level of spending (resulting expenditure level that is too high or too low
than the optimal one), the national development and planning priorities and objectives, as well as the
costs of providing public health and the relevant budget considerations. In this regard, the question of
what the optimal health care spending is not purely technical or econometric, but has
political-economic and social dimensions. Thirdly, it may be theoretically incorrect to make
generalisations and consider a single optimal level for a diverse set of countries that have specific
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institutional and political-economic settings, the pace of medical innovation, the health care reforms
implemented, and other factors. Each country may then have its own unique shape of the
Armey-Rahn curve and unique set of factors that shift it. Fourthly, longer time series may be needed
to examine the Armey-Wagner curve: given that sample size is restricted to the years 1995-2018 (that
fall within a longer period of government downsizing that has started in the early 1980s), there is
possibility that the optimal point has been reached prior to that period. Nonetheless, the findings in
this paper may be instrumental in the discussions on health policy, in the policy design, and in the
appraisal of the level of government expenditure.
Appendix
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for individual cross-sections
Country GDP GDP per capita HX
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Austria 280473 33507 33753.73 3028.5 7.951 0.305
Belgium 340715 42517 31809.1 2790.6 7.180 0.445
Bulgaria 34035 7160 4488.437 1175.8 4.307 0.937
Cyprus 16573 2920 21441.67 2210.6 2.849 0.185
Czechia 142305 26056 13677.12 2350.2 7.767 0.401
Denmark 238508 22257 43447.23 2898.6 7.831 0.665
Estonia 14231 3623 10557.35 2917.6 4.933 0.381
Finland 174332 23843 32814.22 3870.0 7.246 0.314
France 1906537 199274 29936.79 2010.5 7.690 0.354
Germany 2518150 238615 30962.86 2871.1 6.478 0.559
Greece 201787 27329 18513.63 2281.1 6.075 0.488
Hungary 95122 14999 9483.666 1640.9 5.375 0.401
Ireland 163351 51619 37739.37 8718.3 6.733 0.695
Italy 1572830 73004 26797.59 1165.2 6.832 0.455
Latvia 17162 4514 8008.044 2618.5 3.683 0.447
Lithuania 26205 7130 8325.631 2887.9 5.535 0.785
Luxembourg 36874 8178 74406.91 8600.7 4.593 0.404
Netherlands 601314 71564 36642.49 3323.3 6.296 1.368
Norway 308899 38887 64568.95 4492.4 7.217 0.468
Poland 319686 85402 8336.583 2207.4 4.383 0.688
Portugal 169353 12742 16308.1 1051.5 6.991 0.573
Romania 116180 28004 5596.596 1627.5 4.465 1.054
Slovakia 58814 15780 10879.16 2881.0 6.269 0.940
Slovenia 32920 5559 16245.05 2534.7 6.714 0.275
Spain 980507 134642 22261.25 1927.8 5.701 0.648
Sweden 347144 58220 37308.26 4732.7 6.830 0.269
Switzerland 413477 55910 53660.99 4210.0 1.871 0.183
United Kingdom 1793808 242426 29045.62 2785.3 7.853 0.712
All 461475 659128 26322.01 17745.7 5.987 1.680
Note. The economies with above or below average health care spending (as proportion of GDP) as indicated in
bold and italics respectively. Switzerland as outlier is indicated in both bold and italics.
Mean HX per quantile (as % of GDP)
Q1 3.471 Q6 6.811
Q2 4.557 Q7 7.141
Q3 5.088 Q8 7.462




Table 4. Panel unit root tests’ results
Model in levels (constant)
Test GDP K L OP HX HX2 Log(HX) Log(HX2) GDPGR KGR LGR OPGR
LLC -5.006 -1.533 -0.915 -6.725 -3.289 -3.370 -3.201 -3.139 -9.436 -14.297 -6.215 -12.430
IPS 0.286 -1.434 0.773 -0.943 -3.070 -2.987 -3.239 -3.322 -8.362 -14.534 -7.674 -12.296
ADF-Fisher 51.298 78.698 55.088 65.923 89.520 88.182 92.515 94.038 173.643 480.522 160.789 253.348
PP-Fisher 74.926 103.063 39.902 120.996 90.819 80.765 107.824 113.512 203.843 550.238 138.045 443.867
Pesaran CIPS -2.478 -2.089 -2.209 -2.100 -2.119 -2.086 -2.176 -2.126 -2.663 -3.052 -2.469 -3.036
Note. The statistics highlighted in italics or bold indicate non-rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
Model in levels (constant plus trend)
Test GDP K L OP HX HX2 Log(HX) Log(HX2)
LLC -4.225 -1.982 -4.197 -3.684 -2.299 -2.420 -1.847 -1.622
Breitung -2.586 1.908 -4.763 -0.356 -1.853 -1.831 -2.073 -2.086
IPS -2.157 -2.344 -3.963 -3.045 -2.453 -2.481 -2.473 -2.487
ADF-Fisher 69.061 102.711 99.094 93.755 84.243 84.481 84.940 85.354
PP-Fisher 33.242 152.258 24.982 81.547 72.248 58.520 87.872 92.159
Pesaran CIPS -3.124 -2.406 -2.765 -2.338 -2.316 -2.272 -2.363 -2.325
Note. As above.
Model in the first differences (constant)
Test GDP K L OP HX HX2 Log(HX) Log(HX2) GDPGR KGR LGR OPGR
LLC -9.441 -12.397 -6.171 -12.271 -12.487 -12.831 -11.376 -10.948 -18.085 -37.841 -14.206 -20.365
IPS -8.399 -13.549 -7.673 -12.175 -11.936 -12.145 -11.798 -11.758 -18.098 -25.268 -13.702 -21.457
ADF-Fisher 174.201 476.485 160.717 250.580 244.787 249.194 241.867 241.061 376.091 650.060 281.181 448.910
PP-Fisher 205.921 554.214 138.423 442.578 404.001 398.945 428.252 438.904 1086.520 2072.940 770.071 4148.830
Pesaran CIPS -2.687 -3.032 -2.477 -3.005 -3.034 -3.035 -3.051 -3.039 -3.402 -4.632 -3.087 -4.453
Note. As above.
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Model in the first difference (constant plus trend)
Test GDP K L OP HX HX2 Log(HX) Log(HX2)
LLC -7.164 -13.110 -3.778 -10.229 -10.597 -10.916 -9.960 -9.190
Breitung -8.362 -3.420 -8.197 -10.720 -11.069 -11.767 -10.304 -10.185
IPS -5.368 -11.615 -4.640 -10.028 -9.229 -9.439 -9.088 -9.060
ADF-Fisher 122.282 430.763 110.290 197.075 183.490 187.227 181.013 180.540
PP-Fisher 155.768 523.994 94.825 417.418 342.657 332.224 370.703 401.582
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